L'Etat FPR est le 12ème Etat le plus ina pte au monde

D’après le dernier rapport de “Foreign Policy” sur les « Etats Inaptes » (appelés Failed States), le Rwanda (entendez l’Etat mis en place par le FPR depuis le 19 juillet 1994) est le 12ème Etat le moins apte dans le monde (failed state), sur une liste qui en compte 60. Il est cité avant le Burundi (17ème) et juste après l’Afghanistan (11ème).


Pour établir son classemnt, « Foreign Policy » a utilisé 12 indicateurs d’instabilité. Pour le Rwanda, ces indicateurs sont dans l’ordre décroissant de gravité de la situation considérée par critère, l’absence ou la perte de légitimité de l’Etat (Delegimization of State), le déclin économique (Economic Decline), les pressions démographiques (Demographic Pressures), le développement inégal (Uneven Development), le fractionnement des élites (Factionalized Elites), les violations des droits humains (Human Rights), le risque d’intervention étrangère, les revendications de groupe (Group Grievance), les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées, l’incapacité à fournir les services publics et le fait que l’appareil de sécurité est un Etat dans l’Etat.


Delegitimization of State


Economic Decline


Demographic Pressures


Uneven Development


Factionalized Elites


Human flight


Human Rights


External intervention


Group Grievance


Refugees and Displaced Persons


Public Services


Security Apparatus



L’appréciation de « Foreign Policy » relative au rôle de l’appareil de sécurité est largement en deçà de la réalité. En effet, le Rwanda compte les organes de sécurité les plus tentaculaires de la région. Un coup d’œil au budget révèle que les « National Security Services » regroupant les renseignements intérieurs (Internal National Service), les renseignements extérieurs (External National Service) ainsi que l’Immigration et l’Emigration et relevant de la Présidence de la République disposent d’un budget de 2.6 milliards de FRW pour l’année 2005. Cela équivaut au budget du ministère de la justice. C’est plus que le budget des cours et tribunaux. C’est 3 fois le budget consacré à la famille et à la promotion de la femme (0.8 milliards de FRW). On connaît du reste l’omniprésence des agents de renseignement du régime dans les rouages de la société rwandaise. Ce qui devrait empirer le classement de « Foreign Policy ».


Les indicateurs d’instabilité en question ont été notés à partir d’observations faites durant les derniers mois de l’année 2004. « Foreign Policy » et « Fund for Peace » sont des ONG basées aux USA. Ils sont proches de la fondation «Carnegie for Endowment for International Peace ». On ne peut les soupçonner d’antipathie par rapport au régime FPR. Ce rapport a été rendu public au moment où Kagame était en visite aux USA pour y recevoir une énième médaille pour je-ne-sais quoi encore. Il y a une semaine, « The New Times », le tri-hebdomadaire du FPR, titrait que Kagame avait déclaré sans sourciller que « le Rwanda est le pays le plus sûr au monde ». Il ne pouvait recevoir plus cinglant démenti.


Les 60 pays épinglés sont classés en trois groupes de 20 pays chacun. Le premier comprend les pays où la situation est critique, le second les pays qui sont en danger et le troisième les pays au bord de la ligne de stabilité.

"Jean-Baptiste Mbera" <jbmbera@yahoo.fr> 

The Failed States Index
By FOREIGN POLICY & the Fund for Peace
July/August 2005
About 2 billion people live in countries that are in danger of collapse. In the first annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and the Fund for Peace rank the countries about to go over the brink.

America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” That was the conclusion of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy. For a country whose foreign policy in the 20th century was dominated by the struggles against powerful states such as Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the U.S. assessment is striking. Nor is the United States alone in diagnosing the problem. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has warned that “ignoring failed states creates problems that sometimes come back to bite us.” French President Jacques Chirac has spoken of “the threat that failed states carry for the world’s equilibrium.” World leaders once worried about who was amassing power; now they worry about the absence of it.

Failed states have made a remarkable odyssey from the periphery to the very center of global politics. During the Cold War, state failure was seen through the prism of superpower conflict and was rarely addressed as a danger in its own right. In the 1990s, “failed states” fell largely into the province of humanitarians and human rights activists, although they did begin to consume the attention of the world’s sole superpower, which led interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. For so-called foreign-policy realists, however, these states and the problems they posed were a distraction from weightier issues of geopolitics.
Now, it seems, everybody cares. The dangerous exports of failed states—whether international terrorists, drug barons, or weapons arsenals—are the subject of endless discussion and concern. For all the newfound attention, however, there is still uncertainty about the definition and scope of the problem. How do you know a failed state when you see one? Of course, a government that has lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force has earned the label. But there can be more subtle attributes of failure. Some regimes, for example, lack the authority to make collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public services. In other countries, the populace may rely entirely on the black market, fail to pay taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience. Outside intervention can be both a symptom of and a trigger for state collapse. A failed state may be subject to involuntary restrictions of its sovereignty, such as political or economic sanctions, the presence of foreign military forces on its soil, or other military constraints, such as a no-fly zone.
How many states are at serious risk of state failure? The World Bank has identified about 30 “low-income countries under stress,” whereas Britain’s Department for International Development has named 46 “fragile” states of concern. A report commissioned by the CIA has put the number of failing states at about 20.
To present a more precise picture of the scope and implications of the problem, the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY have conducted a global ranking of weak and failing states. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 60 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict. (For each indicator, the Fund for Peace computed scores using software that analyzed data from tens of thousands of international and local media sources from the last half of 2004. For a complete discussion of the 12 indicators, please go to www.ForeignPolicy.com or www.fundforpeace.org.) The resulting index provides a profile of the new world disorder of the 21st century and demonstrates that the problem of weak and failing states is far more serious than generally thought. About 2 billion people live in insecure states, with varying degrees of vulnerability to widespread civil conflict.
The instability that the index diagnoses has many faces. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Somalia, state failure has been apparent for years, manifested by armed conflict, famine, disease outbreaks, and refugee flows. In other cases, however, instability is more elusive. Often, corrosive elements have not yet triggered open hostilities, and pressures may be bubbling just below the surface. Large stretches of lawless territory exist in many countries in the index, but that territory has not always been in open revolt against state institutions.
Conflict may be concentrated in local territories seeking autonomy or secession (as in the Philippines and Russia). In other countries, instability takes the form of episodic fighting, drug mafias, or warlords dominating large swaths of territory (as in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Somalia). State collapse sometimes happens suddenly, but often the demise of the state is a slow and steady deterioration of social and political institutions (Zimbabwe and Guinea are good examples). Some countries emerging from conflict may be on the mend but in danger of backsliding (Sierra Leone and Angola). The World Bank found that, within five years, half of all countries emerging from civil unrest fall back into conflict in a cycle of collapse (Haiti and Liberia).
The 10 most at-risk countries in the index have already shown clear signs of state failure. Ivory Coast, a country cut in half by civil war, is the most vulnerable to disintegration; it would probably collapse completely if U.N. peacekeeping forces pulled out. It is followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Yemen, Liberia, and Haiti. The index includes others whose instability is less widely acknowledged, including Bangladesh (17th), Guatemala (31st), Egypt (38th), Saudi Arabia (45th), and Russia (59th).
Weak states are most prevalent in Africa, but they also appear in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Experts have for years discussed an “arc of instability”—an __expression that came into use in the 1970s to refer to a “Muslim Crescent” extending from Afghanistan to the “Stans” in the southern part of the former Soviet Union. Our study suggests that the concept is too narrow. The geography of weak states reveals a territorial expanse that extends from Moscow to Mexico City, far wider than an “arc” would suggest, and not limited to the Muslim world.
The index does not provide any easy answers for those looking to shore up countries on the brink. Elections are almost universally regarded as helpful in reducing conflict. However, if they are rigged, conducted during active fighting, or attract a low turnout, they can be ineffective or even harmful to stability. Electoral democracy appears to have had only a modest impact on the stability of states such as Iraq, Rwanda, Kenya, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Ukraine ranks as highly vulnerable in large part because of last year’s disputed election.
What are the clearest early warning signs of a failing state? Among the 12 indicators we use, two consistently rank near the top. Uneven development is high in almost all the states in the index, suggesting that inequality within states—and not merely poverty—increases instability. Criminalization or delegitimization of the state, which occurs when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal, or ineffective, also figured prominently. Facing this condition, people often shift their allegiances to other leaders—opposition parties, warlords, ethnic nationalists, clergy, or rebel forces. Demographic factors, especially population pressures stemming from refugees, internally displaced populations, and environmental degradation, are also found in most at-risk countries, as are consistent human rights violations. Identifying the signs of state failure is easier than crafting solutions, but pinpointing where state collapse is likely is a necessary first step.

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