Rejection of UNAMIR II

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE

DES LIGUES DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ;

Aucun témoin ne doit survivre. Le génocide au Rwanda

Rédigé par Alison Des Forges sur la base des recherches de :Alison Des Forges, Eric Gillet, Timothy Longman, Catherine Choquet, Michèle Wagner, Christine Deslaurier, Lynn Welchmann, Trish Hiddleston, Kirsti Lattu, Jemera Rone.

Éditions Karthala, 1999. 936 pages) aux pages 814-815:

"Le génocide se déroulait dans un contexte d’une guerre que le FPR était désireux de gagner, plutôt que de sauver seulement les tutsi. Pendant les trois premiers jours, la 7^ème unité du FPR commandée par le colonel Bagire et 157^ème commandée par le colonel Fred Ibingira brisèrent la résistance des forces gouvernementales dans le Nord-Est. La première unité mobile commandée par le colonel Sam Kaka effectua une poussée vers la capitale dans laquelle elle entra, l'après-midi du 11 avril, « en ligne, comme si c'était une promenade »( Morasuti, « Seth Sendashonga » ; Ntaiibi Kamanzi, Rwanda, Du Génocide à la
Défaite, pp.120-123.). Là, elle rejoignit le 3 ^e bataillon dirigé par le lieutenant-colonel Charles Kayonga qui, stationné au CND, participait à l'action depuis l'après-midi du 7 avril.

Le 12 avril, ces succès initiaux amenèrent les dirigeants du FPR à penser qu'ils pouvaie... remporter une victoire totale sur l'armée rwandaise, ce qu'ils entreprirent de réaliser (Human Rights Watch/FIDH, entretien au téléphone, Nairobi, 7 mars 1998 ;Kamanzi, p. 123.). La stratégie militaire consistait à envoyer des troupes nombreuses pour descendre sur la frontière orientale, tout en attaquant les forces gouvernementales dans la capitale et à Ruhengeri au nord-ouest. Le FPR comptait sur la détermination du gouvernement à défendre le quart Nord-Ouest, région d'où Habyarimana et de nombreux officiers de l'armée étaient originaires. En laissant planer une menace dans cette direction, ils réduisaient la possibilité que le gouvernement transfère une partie importante de ses forces du Nord-Ouest vers d'autres régions. Plutôt que de concentrer l'attaque sur cette zone où l'ennemi était fort, le FPR progressa rapidement dans les régions de l'Est et du Sud, où il était plus faible, avant de se diriger à nouveau vers l'Ouest et le Nord-Ouest en exerçant une pression sur la capitale et le Nord-Ouest (Human Rights Watch/FIDH, entretien au téléphone, Bruxelles, 2 mai 1998). La stratégie du FPR, admirée par d'autres experts militaires, offrait peut-être la meilleure chance de remporter une victoire militaire, mais ne représentait pas le meilleur programme pour sauver des Tutsi. Les soldats envoyés à Ruhengeri, où les Tutsi étaient peu nombreux, eurent moins d'occasions de sauver des vies qu'ils n'en auraient eu dans d'autres régions, où la population tutsi était plus présente.

Le refus de la MINUARII

Lorsque le Conseil de sécurité envisagea d'envoyer au Rwanda une force de maintien de la paix plus importante et dotée d'un mandat plus large de protection des civils, le FPR craignit que celle-ci n'interfère avec son objectif de victoire militaire. Ses dirigeants étaient peut-être particulièrement concernés par le fait que les Français puissent utiliser la force pour protéger le gouvernement intérimaire. Plutôt que d'accueillir favorablement cette initiative et d'en réclamer la mise en œuvre immédiate, le porte parole du FPR à Bruxelles s'y opposa en affirmant qu'il ne restait plus de Tutsi à sauver (Human Rights Watch, entretien au téléphone, Bruxelles, 30 avril 1994). Le 30 avril, Gérard Gahima et Claude Dusaidi du bureau politique du FPR réaffirmèrent cette position dans la déclaration suivante, dont le ton est un tout petit peu moins ferme :

« II est beaucoup trop tard pour une intervention des Nations unies. Le génocide est presque terminé. La plupart des victimes po tentielles du régime ont été tuées ou se sont enfuies. ».

Il poursuivait : « Par conséquent, le Front patriotique rwandais se déclare catégoriquement opposé à l'intervention envisagée des Nations unies et il ne collaborera en aucun cas à son organisation ni à sa mise en œuvre.

Vu ce qui précède, le Front patriotique rwandais :

a. Appelle le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies à ne pas autoriser le déploiement de la force envisagée car une intervention des Nations unies à ce stade ne peut plus être d'aucune utilité en ce qui concerne l'arrêt des massacres. »( Gérald Gahima et Claude Dusaidi, « Déclaration du Bureau politique du Front patriotique rwandais sur le déploiement envisagé d'une force d'intervention des Nations unies au Rwanda », New York, 30 avril 1994)^"

Rejection of UNAMIR II

When the Security Council discussed sending a larger peacekeeping force to Rwanda with a broader mandate to protect civilians, the RPF feared that the force might interfere with its goal of military victory. Its leaders may have been particularly concerned that the French might use the force to protect the interim government. Instead of welcoming the move and urging speedy implementation, the RPF spokesman in Brussels opposed it and asserted that there were no more Tutsi to be saved.25 On April 30, Gerald Gahima and Claude Dusaidi of the RPF political bureau reiterated this position in a slightly less forceful statement which declared:

The time for U.N. intervention is long past. The genocide is almost completed. Most of the potential victims of the regime have either been killed or have since fled.

The statement continued:

Consequently, the Rwandese Patriotic Front hereby declares that it is categorically opposed to the proposed U.N. intervention force and will not under any circumstances cooperate in its setting up and operation. In view of the forgoing [sic] the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

a. Calls upon the U.N. Security Council not to authorize the deployment of the proposed force as U.N. intervention at this stage can no longer serve any useful purpose as far as stopping the massacres is concerned.26

The RPF was, of course, right in declaring that the U.N. had failed to respond at the appropriate time, but they were wrong to conclude that U.N. action, even if tardy, would “no longer serve any useful purpose.” The tragic reality that hundreds of thousands had already been slain in no way negated the need to rescue tens ofthousands of others who were still alive. One member of the political bureau at the time claims that RPF leaders really believed that most Tutsi were dead and that only a few “pockets” remained.27 But they certainly must have known, as did observers abroad, that some 30,000 people were gathered at various sites in Kigali and that more than 20,000 clung to life at Kabgayi with another 10,000 at Nyarushishi. They must have supposed that thousands more still remained in hiding in Butare prefecture, where the killing had become widespread only ten days before.

Representatives of Human Rights Watch and FIDH, who were then receiving frequent telephoned appeals for help from Tutsi hiding in Rwanda, were shocked by the RPF opposition to a force that could save Tutsi lives. They urged the RPF to reconsider its position. On May 2, Eric Gillet of the FIDH wrote Col. Kanyarengwe:

We understand very well the reasons why the RPF would not want to accept an intervention force. But we cannot see any legitimate reason that the RPF might invoke to oppose a solution which would bring the necessary help to the civilian population without interfering with ongoing military operations.28

Diplomats at the Security Council also exerted pressure on the RPF, but without great success. On May 11, Radio Muhabura, the voice of the RPF, still maintained that “the genocide is already finished.”29 On May 18, the day after the Security Council authorized a second peacekeeping force, RPF vice-chairman Denis Polisi complained about the anticipated slowness in mounting the operation. He declared, “People are still suffering every day. People are still dying and we think a month or two is too long....”30 But he was referring expressly to humanitarian assistance and “warned that if they did anything else then they would be considered an enemy force.” Through late May the RPF continued to demand that the peacekeepers stick to purely humanitarian relief rather than engage in moreactive efforts to defend Tutsi from attack. It also insisted that the force be smaller than that the 5,500 troops set by the Security Council resolution of May 17.31

RPF opposition to UNAMIR II contributed to the reluctance of the U.S. and other powers to support such a force, a reluctance which in turn accounts at least in part for the slowness with which the operation was mounted.32 It is impossible to judge how many lives would have been saved had the RPF welcomed the new force and had the U.S. and other U.N. member states been in turn galvanized to send military aid rapidly”.

Source: HRW AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT

LA MALHEUREUSE CAMPAGNE BELGE POUR FAIRE ECHOUER LA MISSION DE LA MINUAR AU RWANDA

CI-DESSOUS, L' INTERSSANT LIEN A LIRE ENTIEREMENT SI ON PEUT POUR MIEUX COMPRENDRE LE ROLE ET LES LARMES DE LA BELGIQUE AU RWANDA.A PARTIR DU 12 AVRIL 1994.

La campagne de la Belgique visant à convaincre les membres du Conseil de sécurité de suspendre entièrement l'opér

“La campagne belge

À partir du 12 avril 1997, la Belgique a insisté sur le retrait intégral de la MINUAR. Dans son télex du 13 avril à DELBELONU relatant son entrevue avec M. Boutros-Ghali, M. Claes confie à la délégation Belge une mission complémentaire qu'il définit comme suit : les postes se trouvant dans les pays qui sont membres du Conseil de sécurité ou qui fournissent des troupes doivent informer d'urgence leurs interlocuteurs de l'analyse faite au point 1 (retrait), de manière que ces pays nous aident dans la mesure du possible à obtenir des Nations Unies une décision rapide de retrait des troupes de la MINUAR….

Si le secrétariat s'oppose au retrait de la MINUAR, c'est surtout parce qu'il se préoccupe du sort de la population locale : " Le secrétariat a déconseillé l'option 2 (forte réduction de la MINUAR) prétextant qu'elle provoquerait un drame humanitaire ... Mon collègue américain estime inacceptable l'argument du drame humanitaire qui, s'il était généralisé, rendrait impraticable la gestion des opérations de maintien de paix." Si le secrétariat s'oppose au retrait de la MINUAR, c'est surtout parce qu'il se préoccupe du sort de la population locale : " Le secrétariat a déconseillé l'option 2 (forte réduction de la MINUAR) prétextant qu'elle provoquerait un drame humanitaire ... Mon collègue américain estime inacceptable l'argument du drame humanitaire qui, s'il était généralisé, rendrait impraticable la gestion des opérations de maintien de paix”.

6 décembre 1997 - Rapport de la Commission d'enquête parlementaire du Sénat de Belgique sur les événements du Rwanda

Quelques dépêches y relatives

SECTION: NEWS/NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL; Ed. F; Pg. 21A
LENGTH: 307 words

HEADLINE: Rwanda rebel chief warns U.N. off
Truce quickly fails as mortar, machine gun fire echoes through capital city of Kigali
BYLINE: Rocky Mountain News Wire Services
DATELINE: KIGALI, Rwanda

BODY:

The commander of rebel forces warned the United Nations on Monday to stay out of the war in Rwanda, and a U.N.-brokered truce fell apart almost as soon as it began.
The truce had been called so U.N. special envoy Iqbal Riza could talk with both sides about deploying 5,500 additional peacekeepers in Rwanda.
But Kagame sharply criticized the planned deployment, saying the United Nations should restrict itself to humanitarian efforts and let the rebels protect Rwandans.

                              Copyright 1994 U.P.I.
                             United Press International
                          May 23, 1994, Monday, BC cycle
SECTION: International
LENGTH: 372 words
HEADLINE: Rwandan rebels lash out at the U.N.
DATELINE: NAIROBI, May 23

BODY:

An official with the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front lashed out at the United Nations Monday, calling the recent Security Council decision to deploy 5,500 troops to the war-torn central African nation ''cynical and irresponsible.''

''Africans know what they need. We don't accept that a foreign force can come to Rwanda and establish law and order,'' RPF Secretary General Theogene Rudasingwa told a news conference in Nairobi.

...

                    Copyright 1994 Guardian Newspapers Limited
                                    The Observer
                                May 21, 1994, Sunday

SECTION: THE OBSERVER NEWS PAGE; Pg. 21
LENGTH: 1160 words
HEADLINE: RWANDA REBELS TALK TOUGH ON PEACEKEEPERS
BYLINE: Mark Huband
HIGHLIGHT:
Mark Huband analyses the dangers of blocking the UN mission, as the death
toll mounts.
BODY:

SIX WEEKS ago, as Rwanda erupted in a genocidal rage, the United Nations pulled out all but 275 of its 2,500 troops. Now, with a death toll of at least 200,000 and the clear acknowledgement that the Hutu government has attempted genocide against the Tutsi minority, the UN wants to send back 5,500 troops.

But the mostly Tutsi rebels are wary. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) -which has taken half the country - sees itself as having been left with the role of conquering and policing Rwanda in the aftermath of the UN pull-out. The UN, desperate to re-establish its credibility, is allowing the rebels to make demands about how and when the peacekeepers will come back - but such deals may backfire.

...'If one side isn't co-operating, then our situation will become untenable.The RPF are now in a stronger position to make demands,' said Dr Abdul Kabia, executive director of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda. 'It's getting more and more difficult to speak with General Kagame (the RPF military chief).'

The RPF has clearly benefited from the UN's American-led fiasco in Somalia last year. Instead of dictating to the rival factions, as the US did in Somalia, General Dallaire hinted strongly last week that the US has conceded many rebel demands on the UN operations. Among them is that the UN must not interfere in its military campaign.

American demands that the new UN force be phased in over more than six weeks as few as 150 troops are due to arrive this week - are clearly a concession to the rebels. But in accepting this demand, the UN is guaranteeing the Rwandan army and death squads several more weeks in which to slaughter Tutsi civilians.

Thousands of Tutsis are still trapped in government-held areas. As the rebels close in, it is likely that the killers will become increasingly desperate in their revenge on the Tutsis.

The events of the past six weeks give credence to the rebels' view that they are best placed to seize territory from the government. But part of the tragedy of Rwanda is that, by pursuing the war for which there appears little alternative, the rebels are strengthening the determination of the death squads.

                    Copyright 1994 Caledonian Newspapers Ltd.
                                The Herald (Glasgow)
                                    May 18, 1994
SECTION: Pg. 4
LENGTH: 445 words
HEADLINE: Rwanda rebels 'will treat UN troops as foes'

BODY:
Mulindi, Rwanda, Tuesday.

RWANDAN rebels warned tonight that if United Nations peacekeepers came between their forces and Government troops, they would be treated as the enemy and engaged.

"Should the (UN) force come in between the two warring sides then it will be treated as an enemy force and will be engaged," said Denis Polisi, deputy vice-chairman of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).

Polisi said the RPF had communicated conditions to the UN in New York on acceptance of a peacekeeping force ordered by the Security Council yesterday, but had received no reply yet.

The 5500-strong contingent called for by the UN is authorised to use force only in self-defence, but the Council's resolution says peacekeepers will have to secure "humanitarian areas" which may have to be protected.

"We only accept the force provided its mission here will be strictly humanitarian . . .

SECTION: Part 5 Africa and Latin America; AFRICA; EAST AFRICA; AL/1996/A;
LENGTH: 494 words
HEADLINE: [3];
Fighting continues in Kigali; RPF leader warns against use of force by UN
SOURCE: Agence France-Presse news agency, Paris, in English 2028 gmt 11 May 94

BODY:

Excerpts from report
Kigali, 11th May: Rebels battled government soldiers in Rwanda's capital Kigali on Wednesday [12th May] as rebel leader Paul Kagame welcomed proposals for a bigger UN force provided its role remained " humanitarian" . But Kagame said the 5,500-strong force suggested by UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus Ghali "to stop the genocide" was too big...

...

Copyright 1994 News World Communications, Inc.
The Washington Times
May 5, 1994, Thursday, Final Edition
SECTION: Part A; WORLD; BRIEFING/AFRICA; BRIEFLY; Pg. A14
LENGTH: 149 words
HEADLINE: Rwanda rebel leader rejects U.N. force
BYLINE: FROM WIRE DISPATCHES AND STAFF REPORTS
DATELINE: RUSOMO, RWANDA

BODY:

The rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) commander said yesterday a U.N. force
cannot bring peace to his blood-soaked country and only a guerrilla victory will
end the massacres.